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CENTRALIZATION OR AUTONOMY? 
 
Abstract 
We explore determinants of subsidiary autonomy in setting HRM practices within US parented 
MNEs, in Europe and Australia. We examine both the effect of strategic context, and the effect of the 
institutional location of the subsidiary. We find that US MNEs show greater centralization of control 
over HRM where the subsidiary faces global markets, in coordinated market economies versus liberal 
market economies, and where union density is low. 
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HRM IN US SUBSIDIARIES IN EUROPE AND AUSTRALIA: CENTRALIZATION OR 
AUTONOMY? 
Although an important source of competitive advantage for multinational enterprises (MNEs) may lie 
in their ability to deploy organizational and management capabilities worldwide, many MNEs have 
chosen, for strategic reasons, to concede considerable autonomy to their subsidiaries in designing their 
own management systems (Kostova and Roth, 2002; Noorderhaven and Harzing, 2003; Myloni et al., 
2004). As Harzing (2000) has demonstrated, subsidiary autonomy in human resource management 
(HRM) is a feature of MNEs that are generally classified as multi-domestics; that is, MNEs whose 
subsidiaries have domestic mandates involving a local market scope accompanied by considerable 
latitude to engage in local product modification and local adaptation of marketing.   
On the other hand there are those, such as Birkinshaw and Hood (1998), who view subsidiary  
autonomy as not only determined by the relationship of the head office to its subsidiaries, but also by 
the nature of the local institutional environment in which the subsidiary operates. They argue that the 
nature of local legal conditions, the cultural environment, and the influence of the local authorities 
will all impinge on the degree to which subsidiaries have local control over their HRM systems.  
The aim of this paper is to combine these two perspectives by simultaneously examining the 
effects of the strategic role of the subsidiary and the institutional environment in which the subsidiary 
is located, in relation to the degree of centralization of control of HRM policies imposed by corporate 
headquarters. We examine the influence of the strategic role of the subsidiary in the sense of whether 
it has a purely local market orientation or whether it serves international markets. At the same time we 
investigate the impact of the environment in which the subsidiary is located by differentiating 
between the response of the MNE to the broad institutional setting at the level of national business 
systems (Whitley, 1992; Lane, 1992; Sorge, 1995; Foss, 1999; Hollingsworth, 2003; Redding, 2005) 
in which the subsidiary is located and, separately, the impact of labor unions on MNEs’ ability to 
exert centralized control (e.g., Ortiz, 1998; Giardini et al., 2005; Singe and Croucher, 2005).  
We argue that US MNEs operate in relation to host country environments on the basis of both 
“economic rationality” and “normative rationality” (Oliver, 1997). That is on the one hand within-
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firm managerial choices (of organizational goals) are guided by an economic rationality and by 
motives of efficiency, effectiveness and profitability On the other hand, though, firms also operate 
within an institutional framework of norms, values, and taken-for granted assumptions about what 
constitutes appropriate or acceptable economic behavior (Oliver, 1997:699; Fenton-O’Creevy and 
Wood, 2007). Thus a decision by a US MNE in regard to exerting centralized control of a subsidiary’s 
HRM-regime is motivated not only by economic self-interest but also by deeply-held assumptions 
concerning appropriate goal setting which arise out of the parent companies’ embeddedness in a 
particular (USA) home country institutional setting.  
As, Oliver (1991) has argued, firms do not simply acquiesce to institutional pressures. Their 
responses to host country institutional pressures will lie on a continuum from acquiescence through, 
compromise, avoidance and defiance to attempts to manipulate the institutional setting. The 
antecedents of their responses include competing institutional pressures, perceptions of economic 
(dis)benefits associated with those pressures and their dependence on important institutional 
constituents who may act to enforce institutional constraints.  
Thus we argue that given significant divergence between parent and host country institutional 
context and  perceived economic disadvantages of compliance,  US MNEs will actively resist host 
country institutional pressures except when coerced to comply by active institutional constituents such 
as labor unions on which they are dependent (Hitt et al., 2004; Peng et al., 2005; Oliver, 1991).  Thus 
in the context of divergent institutional settings US MNEs will seek centralized control of the HRM 
agenda except when they are dependent on cooperation from  labor unions substantially entrenched 
within the subsidiary.  
              In the next sections we first distinguish two generic national business systems: 
liberal market economies and coordinated market economies and a continuum between 
them (Hall and Soskice, 2001; Hall and Gingerich, 2004). Thereafter, we delineate the 
management style and HRM procedures characteristic of US MNEs. We then address the 
manner in which US MNEs may be assumed to treat the issue of centralized control of core 
HRM practices in their subsidiaries according to the business system in which their 
subsidiaries are located. This is followed by a discussion of the role of labor unions where 
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we argue that high union density in US MNE subsidiaries will result in less centralized 
control. Finally, we deal with the way in which the strategic role or market scope of 
subsidiaries influences the degree of centralized control. The resulting three hypotheses are 
then tested and discussed.  
Liberal versus coordinated market economies 
A common distinction within the national business systems approach is between the 
“liberal market economies” (LMEs) of the US, the UK, Ireland and Australia and the 
“coordinated market economies” (CMEs) of much of Continental Europe (Hall and Soskice, 
2001).  Firms operating in the latter context are regarded as significantly more institutionally 
constrained than those in the former, in the sense that they operate within contexts whose 
legal frameworks and systems of industrial relations constrain managers’ autonomy in 
applying market driven or technologically contingent management practices. Hall and 
Soskice (2001) point to a number of systematic and fundamental differences in HRM 
practices between firms operating in LMEs and CMEs that are derived from these 
institutional structures. These principally involve pay policy, the degree of job security, and 
employee training. Whereas in LMEs there are substantial pay differentials even within the 
same industries, in CMEs much pay negotiation occurs at the industry level, taking pay 
negotiation out of the workplace. While in LMEs, the opportunities for employee dismissal for 
economic reasons are relatively unconstrained, in CMEs there is a tradition of long-term 
labor contracts and substantially greater security against arbitrary layoffs. Employee training 
represents a third significant difference. Whereas in CMEs (driven by the long term nature of 
the employment relationship) training is traditionally not only firm specific but also industry 
specific, in LMEs training is highly firm specific.  
These substantial differences between LMEs and CMEs are given an empirical underpinning 
in Hall and Gingerich’s (2004) coordination index1. Hall and Gingerich are able to demonstrate on the 
basis of econometric data that key measures of corporate governance and labor relations in the 
                                               
1 We are grateful to an anonymous reviewer for the suggestion to use this index in 
the analysis 
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political economy can be combined to produce a single factor which captures much of the variance of 
these elements. The index combines measures of  shareholder power, dispersion of firm control, size 
of stock market, level and degree of wage coordination and labor turnover. All are highly correlated 
with a single factor. Thus their index for the first time provides the opportunity to specify the position 
of a country in terms of a single LME-CME continuum that runs from “0” for the USA to “1” for 
Austria.  
In calculating their coordination index they have included a wide range of developed 
countries thereby rendering a “varieties of capitalism approach to comparative capitalism pertinent 
not only to relatively pure types of LMEs or CMEs” (Hall and Gingerich, 2004: 37) but also to the 
many less pure or ambiguous forms. With coordination conceived as a continuum between “pure 
LME and “pure” CME the index can be used to locate a much greater number of nations vis-à-vis one 
another than previous “pure-types” dichotomous approaches had permitted. At the same time, though, 
the index does confirm the validity of the basic distinction between LMEs and CMEs.   
Within Europe, not only Hall and Soskice (2001) but also Albert (1991), Hollingsworth and 
Boyer (1997), Gooderham et al. (1999), Geppert et al. (2002) and Tempel (2002) have exemplified 
the basic distinction between LMEs and CMEs with reference to the UK and Germany, with the 
former as the main pure type of LME and the latter epitomizing the CME. The Hall and Gingerich 
index serves to validate this approach with the UK having the value of “.07” and Germany the value 
of “.95”. Typically, it is argued that UK firms coordinate their activities primarily through competitive 
markets and hierarchies. Firm relations are characterized by arm’s-length exchanges of goods and 
services in a context of competition and formal contracting. Firm governance is characterized by the 
primacy of shareholder interests and the operation of well-developed capital markets. In short, like the 
USA, it is a "shareholder economy" under which private enterprise is about maximizing short-term 
profits for investors rather than seeking any broader harmony of interests. Within this context 
managerial decisions are typically perceived as legitimate to the extent that they align closely with 
shareholder interests, maximizing firm profitability. It is also unique in the European context in that 
during the 1980s its employment legislation and thereby its industrial relations environment was 
subject to radical changes. Most notably, this legislation includes the Employment Acts of 1980, 
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1982, 1988 and 1990, and the Trade Union Act of 1984. Coupled to these acts are severe civil 
penalties. Together, these acts curbed the unions' right to recognition, outlawed the closed shop and 
secondary picketing, and narrowed the freedom of unions to call strikes (for instance, by a 
requirement that a secret ballot of the members is to be called first). The result was a considerable 
increase in general managerial autonomy coupled to a pronounced reduction in the influence of trade 
unions (Edwards et al., 1992; Rubery and Wilkinson, 1994). 
Germany, the classic exemplar of the CME, is characterized by a considerably greater 
emphasis on coordination through non-market mechanisms – relational contracting, coordination and 
mutual monitoring through networks – and greater reliance on collaborative rather than competitive 
relationships to build firm competence. Firm governance is characterized by attention to a wider set of 
stakeholder interests, reinforced by legislation on employee rights and by financial arrangements that 
are less reliant on open capital markets. One particular feature of Germany is its elaborate system of 
co-determination, which is regulated at the plant level by the Works Constitution Act of 1972 and at 
the enterprise level by the Works Constitution Act of 1952, superseded in 1976 (Hollingsworth, 
1997). As a consequence of this legislation, employers need to maintain positive relations with the 
works councils. These are employee-elected bodies legally entitled to co-determination, consultation, 
and access to important information, hence restricting the degree of managerial autonomy (Klikauer, 
2002; Wächter and Stengelhofen, 1995; Scholz, 1996:123-124). In summary, German work-life is 
characterized not only by powerful labor representative bodies, but also by strong work legislation 
that constrains managerial autonomy in the firm. Within this context managerial decisions are seen as 
legitimate to the extent that they accord with a range of stakeholder interests. Maximizing profitability 
is still an important goal but balanced against competing claims. 
The Hall and Gingerich (2004) index not only confirms the position of Germany as a 
prototypical CME but it is also confirmatory in regard to the categorization of a number of other 
European nations that have been viewed as constituting relatively pure forms of CMEs. This includes 
the Netherlands, Switzerland Belgium and Austria all of which previous studies indicate score highly 
in relation to measures of corporatism and the centralization of labor relations (Dell’Aringa and 
Lodovici, 1992: 32-33) and all of which have similar social partnership institutions to that of 
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Germany, including works council institutions. In addition the Hall and Gingerich index indicates that 
the concept of CME can be extended to include the Nordic countries of Sweden, Finland, Denmark 
and Norway. This is line with previous studies that have indicated that in these countries there is a 
strong and pronounced legislative framework, which ensures that labor unions are consulted on a 
range of HRM issues such as downsizing and outsourcing. (Bévort, Pedersen and Sundbo, 1995). 
Thus together with the strong protection of individual rights afforded to employees by laws and 
agreements, this means that the general autonomy of management is significantly restricted 
(Kristensen, 1992).  
Hall and Soskice (2001) observe that a number of European countries, including France, Italy, 
Spain and Portugal, have somewhat ambiguous positions in relation to the LME/CME distinction. 
Hall and Gingerich’s (2004) index reveals that while these nations may have somewhat weaker 
institutional capacities for strategic coordination in labor relations than northern European nations, 
possibly because of the historical nature of their union movements they are clearly positioned towards 
the CME end of the index’s LME/CME continuum.    
Hall and Gingerich’s index also makes it possible to distinguish between countries that, in 
varying degrees, fall within the LME category in its broader sense. Thus Australia, with its separate 
state-operated, as opposed to national, industrial relations regime cannot be regarded as a “pure” 
LME.  However, particularly since the introduction of the Industrial Relations Reform Act in 1993 
which significantly modified the state arbitral system (Barry and Wailes, 2004) Australia clearly 
cannot be classified as a CME. Not only did this act limit the terms and conditions of bargaining but it 
also effectively created the possibility of legally sanctioned non-union agreements.  Likewise 
although Ireland is by no means a “pure” LME, in that trade unions enjoy strong legitimacy and 
collective bargaining rights (Gunnigle et al., 2002), there are grounds to regard it as having acquired 
many LME characteristics as a consequence of its pursuit of foreign direct investment. This has 
involved granting legitimacy to “greenfield” sites, which permit firms to decide their preferred form 
of industrial relations (Gunnigle et al., 2001). Significantly for our study, research has indicated that it 
is particularly US MNEs that have used this latitude to implement US-style personnel policies 
(Gunnigle et al., 1997). 
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Key HRM issues for US MNEs 
Typically in the period since the 1970s US MNEs have adopted a ‘remote’ 
management style where strategic decisions reside with corporate headquarters, which 
monitor profits and allocate resources to the operationally independent geographical 
divisions (Mayer and Whittington, 2002; Bartlett, 1986). This early adoption by US 
corporations of a remote management style derives from their LME setting where firms, 
unlike their continental European counterparts, have an objective need to regularly convey to 
capital markets the viability of their individual operations (Whitley, 1997).  Harzing et al. 
(2002) have shown that in practice this remote management style means that US MNEs 
generally do not, unlike German MNEs, attempt to apply direct personal control to their 
subsidiaries. Instead they primarily rely on impersonal control and indirect personal control 
mechanisms. 2   
Direct personal control involves the extensive use of expatriates in top subsidiary 
positions. Impersonal control comprises not only the monitoring of financial outputs, but also 
standardized, centralized procedures. As we have indicated above, Hall and Soskice (2001) 
have identified two core HRM procedures characteristic of LME firms such as US MNEs. 
One is the operation of highly differentiated pay systems and the other is the use of flexible 
employment contracts that make it easier to recruit labor and expand the work force in order 
to take advantage of new opportunities. This implies the desirability of controlling the 
industrial relations agenda from the centre. Indirect personal control involves informal 
cultural control over subsidiaries through socialization and training of and communication 
with key managers. 
One core formal practice identified by Harzing et al. (2002) that contributes to indirect 
personal control is that of training with the purpose of securing that all units of the MNE work 
towards common organizational goals. The degree to which training, whether it be management 
                                               
2 Employing a factor analysis, Harzing et al. (2002) conclude that control 
mechanisms used by MNEs can be classified in terms of one dimension, 
personal/impersonal. She further finds that personal control mechanisms can be subdivided 
into direct/indirect.  This is not the case for impersonal control mechanisms.  
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development or training and development in general, can promote and engender common values 
across the MNE is dependent on the degree to which the control of training is centralized.   
In contrast to German and Japanese MNEs, US MNEs make relatively little use of direct 
personal control mechanisms (Harzing et al., 2002). Instead impersonal control is supplemented by 
indirect personal control via the socialization and acculturation of managers and key employee 
groups. 
In Table 1 we have summarized those HRM practices that are critical for the realization of the 
two types of control characteristically applied by US MNEs to their subsidiaries. Thus, in this paper, 
we will focus on the locus of decision-making in relation to the following six central HRM practices: 
pay policy, workforce expansion, recruitment and selection, the industrial relations agenda, 
management development and training and development in general. In essence we are investigating 
under what circumstances US MNEs are “obliged” to centralize decision-making over these practices.    
 
                                                  TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
Institutional pressures  
Neo-institutional theory (Scott, 1995) suggests that, in order to survive, organizations need to 
gain legitimacy and do so through isomorphism with salient institutions. That is, they will tend to 
conform to the rules and belief systems prevailing in their environment (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983); 
what Oliver (1997) describes as normative rationality. While this theory has been supported in the 
context of unitary environments it is more problematic in complex environments with multiple 
institutional demands (Xu and Shenkar, 2002).  Since the MNE is situated both in its country of origin 
and, through its subsidiaries, in a number of other locations, it operates under multiple, possibly 
conflicting institutional pressures. Thus, MNEs are confronted with the pressure for global integration 
to achieve internal consistency on the one hand and the need for a local orientation to achieve local 
external legitimacy on the other (Westney, 1993; Kostova, 1999; Kostova and Roth, 2002).  
Oliver (1991) has argued that institutional approaches underplay the role of agency 
and has attempted to identify the strategic responses of organizations operating under such 
diverse conditions. Taking into account both organizational self-interest and active agency in 
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organizational responses to institutional pressures and expectations, she proposes that 
rather than simply acquiescing to institutional pressures, organizations have a range of 
potential responses ranging from acquiescence, through compromise, avoidance and 
defiance to attempts to manipulate the institutional setting.  
This range of potential responses is especially important in the context of legally 
mandated elements of the institutional context. In particular, while firms may be reluctant to 
engage in outright defiance of local laws, they are often in a position to bypass or ameliorate 
the impact of legislation. There is evidence that US MNEs engage in this full gamut of 
responses in response to local institution pressures, even where coercive pressures have a 
basis in legislation. For example, in Germany (with arguably some of the most strongly 
policed legislative constraints on managerial choice about HRM practices and governance) 
studies document US firms  engaging in this full range of  responses to the German 
business system (Singe and Croucher, 2005).    
Oliver (1991:164) argues that the lower the degree of consistency of institutional norms or 
requirements with organizational goals, the greater the likelihood of organizational resistance to 
institutional pressures.  The potential for organizational resistance would be particularly likely in 
relation to HRM practices for which internal consistency is essential for the MNE (Rosenzweig and 
Nohria, 1994).  In the case of US MNEs this entails the six HRM practices we have delineated above.  
MNEs are particularly likely to engage in resistance to institutional pressures when the logic 
of both economic and normative rationality coincide (Oliver, 1991; 1997). That is, MNEs will show 
greater resistance where they see low economic benefits (or disbenefits) of compliance and where 
they see low legitimacy benefits attaching to compliance in relation to their home institutional setting. 
Thus US MNEs not only have a financial incentive to resist the costly, non-market derived practices 
associated with CMEs and which run counter to their own HRM practices, but because of parent 
embeddedness in the US institutional setting the legitimacy benefits of local compliance are diluted.  
By contrast, for subsidiaries within LMEs, local institutions pose little resistance to the 
implementation of US MNEs’ core HRM practices: indeed local institutions are actually supportive of 
them. 
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In practice this means that one should expect a pronounced attempt by US MNEs to 
centralize the control of HRM in CMEs rather than delegating it to local managers who, 
because of their embeddedness in the local institutional setting, may be disinclined to defy 
local norms. While managers in the subsidiary and in head office are each likely to be 
concerned about the coercive legal pressures facing the subsidiary, embedded as they are 
in different institutional settings, they will face different normative pressures and have 
different cognitive-cultural mindsets. In particular, managers in a CME setting work in a 
context in which decision legitimacy depends on balancing the claims of multiple 
stakeholders, whereas managers in the US head office are embedded in a shareholder 
economy where decision legitimacy depends primarily on a focused concern for shareholder 
value.  In this context, a US parent wishing to ensure that local (CME) constraints are 
bypassed or upheld in the letter rather than spirit of the law is unlikely to delegate HRM 
policy-setting to local managers.  
For a US MNE, ensuring through centralized impersonal control that its market-
derived values and management systems are adhered to by their subsidiaries is of 
considerably greater consequence in the context of CMEs than for LMEs where values and 
systems will be largely contiguous with those of the US. Case study research has 
documented the strenuous efforts US MNEs will make to overcome institutional blockages to 
the implementation of their standard systems where there is a significant gap between home 
and host country institutional context (see e.g. Almond et al, 2005). There is also 
considerable documentation of attempts made by US MNEs to overcome and erode the 
constraints on their managerial autonomy imposed by German institutions (for a review see 
Singe and Croucher, 2005).   Further, we argue that indirect personal control, via training 
and other activities designed to enlist managers in a common set of values and approaches, 
will be unlikely to succeed alone in the face of a significant gap in institutional context 
between parent and subsidiary. Thus in the face of such a gap, the MNE will be inclined to 
seek centralized, control.  
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The impact of labor unions  
However, CME’s (in contrast to LMEs) are also associated with strong and well organized 
labor unions. As Oliver (1991) notes, even where they have legal backing, the efficacy of institutional 
pressures relies on the power of institutional constituents, with a stake in the outcomes, to police 
them. Thus MNE resistance to institutional pressures is less likely where the subsidiary is directly 
exposed to key institutional constituents with a stake in outcomes with labor unions playing an 
especially important role in the maintenance and enforcement of HR related institutions.  
Our notion, above, of reluctance by MNEs to accept institutional pressures does apparently 
run counter to the assumptions of, for example, Ferner (1997) and Tempel (2002) that the extent to 
which US MNEs are able or willing to superimpose their country-of-origin concerns will vary 
according to the degree to which the local institutional context is “permissive”. That is, they assume 
that the centralization of control of HRM in regard to key concerns will be more a feature of 
subsidiaries located in LMEs rather than CMEs. We argue that this assumption is a product of 
conflating national business systems with the agency represented by institutional constituents of 
which labor unions are of particular importance (Croucher et al., 2006). Although national business 
system and degree of unionization are significantly correlated, the one does not necessarily imply the 
other. As Singe and Croucher (2005:134) indicate in their review of the behavior of US MNEs in 
Germany, while survey evidence generally shows relatively high degrees of compliance by US MNEs 
in relation to institutional pressures, there is also substantial case study evidence of US MNEs 
avoiding these pressures and actively pressuring “employees to internalize management logics and 
reject trade union links.” There are even cases in CME settings of firms that have avoided entering 
into collective agreements with unions thereby circumventing the core, active link between the 
strictures of the regulatory environment and the firm (e.g. Royle, 2002). In these cases centralization 
by US MNEs is significantly more feasible than in cases where subsidiaries have to confront union 
organizations. While, in some settings (e.g. Germany, Netherlands) works councils are also a an 
important institutional stakeholder, their power is strongly linked to that of the unions (French 2001: 
571).  As Wever, (1994:468) has shown, because works councils are highly dependent on unions for 
resources and support, the unions “in many ways shape the works councils strategies and actions”.  
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While our arguments above particularly apply to CMEs, as Gooderham and Nordhaug (1997) 
have reported, even within LMEs, labor unions, when present, are able to exert an influence that 
obliges management to take their views on HRM issues into account. We may therefore suppose that 
US MNEs faced with unions which represent a substantial proportion of the work-force will prefer to 
delegate HRM policy to the subsidiary level where the knowledge of how to manage the subsidiary-
union relationship is located rather than attempting to impose it centrally: it is difficult to carry out 
detailed labor negotiations across the Atlantic. Case study research in the UK on the US parent-
subsidiary relationship also suggests that local management may draw on their relationship with the 
union and their claimed understanding of that relationship as a political resource in persuading the 
parent company of the inadvisability of imposing centrally determined HRM policies (Hamill, 1984, 
Ferner et al., 2004: 382). 
Thus on the one hand we can see that US MNEs will be more motivated to seek control of HR 
practices in subsidiaries based in CMEs. On the other hand, the greater level of unionization in CMEs 
will make such resistance less likely. However, since unionization varies between firms within 
economies, we can separate out the effect of institutional distance between US parent and CME based 
subsidiaries and the effect of unionization. Thus we may hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 1: Controlling for level of unionization, the degree of centralized control 
that US MNEs impose on their subsidiaries will vary according to host country. That is, 
the higher the host country’s score on the Coordination Index, the greater the degree 
of centralized control on subsidiaries.  
Hypothesis 2: The higher the level of unionization in a subsidiary, the less the US 
MNE  will impose centralized control on that subsidiary. 
Subsidiary market scope  
So far we have considered the institutional context for control of HRM policies. However, it 
is unlikely that the extent to which MNEs grant autonomy to subsidiaries in respect of HRM is 
divorced from wider corporate strategy. Indeed one of the primary factors identified in prior work as 
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predicting subsidiary autonomy is the strategic role of the subsidiary; particularly the extent to which 
it serves purely local markets or holds a global product mandate. 
The degree of subsidiary market scope may vary significantly. At the one end of the spectrum 
there are subsidiaries whose mandate is purely domestic and which aim at achieving maximum 
responsiveness to local market conditions, at the other end subsidiaries which have global product 
mandates (Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1989). Subsidiaries with purely domestic mandates extensively 
customize their products and skills and marketing strategies to conform to variations in local market 
conditions. Although the parent company coordinates financial controls and some marketing policy, 
and may even centralize some R&D and component production, each subsidiary behaves like an 
independent strategic business unit. That is products in subsidiaries of multi-domestic MNEs  have 
country-specific design in order to tailor products to local needs (Roth, 1992). As a consequence these 
subsidiaries are characterized by a substantial degree of autonomy in terms of the MNE and a 
pronounced dependence on the local environment (Roth, 1992).   
In our introduction we referred to Harzing’s (2000) finding that subsidiaries with a purely 
domestic market focus, in the sense that they only serve within-national markets, are indeed less likely 
to be subjected to centralized control than those which serve global markets. This corresponds with 
studies by Garnier (1982), Martinez and Jarillo (1991) and Roth (1992). It is also similar to Kihn’s 
(2001) findings that suggest that when the degree of multi-domestic strategy increases, the parent 
company places relatively less weight on operational and behavioral controls. The greater autonomy 
in terms of these controls of MNEs with a local market-orientation is in part because their semi-
detached status means that they are of less consequence for the MNE than if they were serving global 
markets on behalf of the MNE (Taggart and Hood, 1999), and in part because their mandate to engage 
in local product and marketing adaptation implies a local approach to HRM. Thus our third hypothesis 
is as follows: 
Hypothesis 3: US MNEs will impose less centralized control on subsidiaries that 
serve domestic rather than international markets. 
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Control variables  
When considering variations in the degree of centralized control imposed by US MNEs on 
their subsidiaries, Young and Tavares (2004) list a number of subsidiary features that previous 
research has taken into account when dealing with the topic of subsidiary autonomy. One is industry: 
we may assume that subsidiaries that deliver services will generally be locally adapted to a greater 
extent than manufacturing plants and therefore less subject to centralized control. Another is the 
relative impact of size: the smaller the subsidiary, the less likely it is that the MNE will invest in 
centralized control. A third is the age of the subsidiary: MNEs may find it less necessary to impose 
centralized control on older subsidiaries because these during the course of time have been 
sufficiently socialized into the way the MNE conducts HRM.  
 
Methods 
To test our predictions we have employed data derived from the 1999 Euronet-Cranet survey 
of HRM in European countries. The overall strategy of the survey was to mail appropriately translated 
questionnaires to human resource managers in representative national samples of firms with more 
than one hundred employees. Problems in ensuring that the selection and interpretation of topic areas 
was not biased by one country's approach, as well as problems related to the translation of concepts 
and questions, were largely overcome by close collaboration between business schools located in each 
country (for a detailed description of the Euronet-Cranet approach, see Brewster et al., 1996). 
Although the response rate for the individual countries is relatively low, mostly between 20 and 35 
per cent, analyses of previous Euronet-Cranet surveys suggest that the statistical representativeness 
has not been impaired (Brewster et al., 1994).  
The total survey data set covers 8,050 firms. In terms of the various national samples our 
overall sub-sample of 441 US owned firms varies from a low of 4 percent of the total sample in Denmark 
and Norway, through 8 and 11 per cent respectively in Germany and the UK respectively to 22 per cent in 
Ireland, and 23 per cent in Australia.  These marked national differences in the proportion of US owned 
firms in our sample are not surprising given the very different shares of foreign ownership in each of the 
economies. 
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Table 2 summarizes the country distribution of the sample. 
 
                                          TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
Dependent Variable 
Centralized control index: The degree of centralized control experienced by the subsidiary is 
measured by respondents indicating where policies are set in relation to each of the six core HRM 
categories:  pay and benefits, workforce expansion, recruitment and selection, industrial relations, 
management development and training and development. Respondents were asked to indicate where 
policies in relation to these issues were determined with possible locations being: ‘International HQ’, 
‘National HQ’, ‘Subsidiary’, ‘Site/ establishment’. Responses were recoded 1 for policies set at 
international headquarters, 0 for policies set within the host country. These responses were summed to 
generate a count index of centralized control with values ranging from 0 to 6 (see Table 3). We 
considered this to be more appropriate than a coding strategy that took account of all four potential 
responses, since our focus is on the extent to which control is exercised directly by the parent as 
opposed to within the host country. The level at which control is exercised within the host country 
(national HQ, subsidiary, or establishment) is not a central concern for this study and is likely to 
reflect establishment size and idiosyncrasies of the local organization of the MNE. 
The distribution of the centralized control index is typical of a count variable and highly non-
normal (table 3). It is also notable that a high proportion of subsidiaries (43.3%) have none of the six 
HR policies controlled directly by the parent. Only in the case of subsidiaries that are both located in 
CME settings and that have avoided high levels of unionization of their workforces do we expect to 
observe a significant tendency by US MNEs to centralize control of HRM.    
           TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
 
Independent Variables    
Coordination Index:  We operationalized the LME – CME continuum by using an index of 
degree of within country economic coordination recently developed by Hall and Gingerich (2004). 
They draw on macroeconomic data on finance market and labor market coordination within each 
 18
country to construct the index. Through factor analysis they show that the different components of the 
index combine into a single dimension (eigen-value, 3.12) 
Level of unionization was operationalized as Union Density: the proportion of 
employees in the subsidiary who are members of a trade union: ‘0%’, ‘1-10%’, 11-
25%’, ‘26-50%’, ‘51-75%’, and ‘76-100%’ were coded respectively as 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 
and 6. 
Subsidiary Market Scope:  Subsidiary respondents were asked to categorize the 
market for their organization’s products or services: Response categories were local, 
regional, national, European, and worldwide. European or worldwide were recoded 1 
and all other responses were coded 0.  We collapsed the local, regional (within 
nation) and national categories, since they do not bear on the extent to which we can 
expect the subsidiary to be globally integrated into the operations of the parent. 
While there might be a case for keeping European and worldwide distinct, the 
inclusion of Australian subsidiaries alongside European subsidiaries implied that the 
meaning of ‘European’ markets as distinct from worldwide markets would become 
less clear. 
Control Variables 
Manufacturing Sector: Respondents were asked to indicate the main sector in 
which the subsidiary operates. Manufacturing was coded as 1 with services coded 
as 0.  
Organization size: To measure size we have employed log n of the total 
number of employees in the subsidiary.  
Age of subsidiary: Log n (1999 - year of founding or acquisition). 
Analysis  
As may be seen in Table 4, there was a significant proportion of missing values in the data. In 
particular a key variable, union density, had 15% missing values, and list-wise missing values amount 
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to 35%. This is not unusual in surveys of this kind (especially for union membership data) but it 
presents a problem for the analysis. We have, thus, used a multiple imputation approach to handling 
the missing data. In this approach, missing values are imputed from all other information in the data 
set. The results of analyses are calculated in a way which fully accounts for the uncertainty associated 
with imputing the missing data. The results are only likely to be biased if union density data is non-
ignorable missing, that is, ‘missingness’ is correlated with the value of the missing data. However, 
there is no prima facie reason to believe that respondents’ willingness to report union density will be 
influenced by union density. Moreover, our success in explaining ‘missingness’ in terms of other 
variables (see appendix) offers substantial reassurance. The multiple imputation approach to handling 
missing data and our use of it is described in the Appendix. 
                                              
                                       TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
Our dependent variable, the centralized control index, is not normally distributed (see Table 
3). Since the dependent variable was a count with a non-normal distribution, OLS regression was not 
appropriate. To test our hypotheses we thus drew on a variant of the general linear model more suited 
to count data: negative binomial3 regression (Long, 1997:230-38). Standard errors and significance 
levels were adjusted for the uncertainty with which missing data were imputed. 
Results 
Table 5 displays (multiple imputation) zero-order correlations and descriptive statistics for all 
variables. Significance levels were adjusted for the uncertainty with which missing values were 
imputed. As can be seen, although there is a significant and positive correlation between the 
coordination index and union density, the correlation is only moderate (.22).  This means, as we 
suggested in our discussion of hypotheses 1 and 2 above, that the one does not necessitate the other. 
The table also indicates that there is no significant correlation between a subsidiary having a local 
market orientation and the coordination index. In other words, the decision to allocate a subsidiary a 
                                               
3 Negative binomial regression was chosen rather than Poisson regression since the 
independent variable is ‘over-dispersed’ (i.e. variance significantly greater than the mean). 
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local market role is not made as a response to institutional conditions, but apparently for purely 
strategic reasons. The table also indicates that union density is unrelated to market orientation.  
 
TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE 
 
Table 6 shows the results of the negative binomial regression.   
 
TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE 
 
Variables were entered hierarchically in the order shown in the table. The regression model 
provides a good fit to the data in that both Pearson chi squared/df and deviance/df are close to 1.  
Wald statistics show whether each variable makes a significant unique contribution to explaining 
variance in the centralized control index. Exp(B) can be interpreted as the multiplier by which the 
centralized control index changes for a unit change in an independent variable (we use this in our 
calculation of effect sizes below). The table indicates that none of the control variables has significant 
Wald statistics.  
The results support hypothesis 1, in that US MNEs impose a greater degree of control on their 
subsidiaries located in CMEs in comparison with those located in LMEs. The parameter estimate 
suggests centralized control is about 49% higher for firms in countries at the top of the scale (e.g. 
Austria) than for firms in countries at the bottom of the scale (e.g. UK). 
As hypothesized (H2), union density is inversely associated with centralized control. For a 
one-unit increase in union density, there is a 13% reduction in centralized control. For a standard 
deviation increase in union density (1.79) centralized control is reduced by 22% (i.e. 1-exp(1.79 x -
0.14)). The difference between firms with no union presence and those with the highest union 
presence amounts to a reduction of 50% in the centralized control index.  
As a further check on our first two hypotheses, we examined the degree of centralized control 
for different levels of unionization and coordination index. 
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                                     TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE 
Table 7 compares the degree of centralization of HRM in the subsidiaries of US MNEs for 
different levels of union membership (zero unionization versus some degree of unionization) and 
country score on the Hall-Gingerich coordination index (high, medium and low). The results are 
consistent with hypotheses 1 and 2. However the table appears to also suggest an interaction effect 
between the level of union membership and institutional context in that we may observe a much 
greater impact of level of unionization on the centralization of HRM for subsidiaries located in 
relatively “pure” CME-settings (coordination index ≥.70) than on those located in relatively “pure” 
LME-settings (c.i. ≤ .29).  For the former the difference between union and non-union cells is 31%, 
for the latter 12%. However, this interaction effect is not statistically significant. Given the sample 
size this is not surprising. Tests for interaction terms require large samples to achieve much power.   
Finally, the results contained in Table 6 support our third hypothesis: US MNEs will impose 
less centralized control on subsidiaries that serve domestic markets as opposed to international 
markets. For firms that face a global market, centralized control is 65% higher than for those facing a 
domestic market.   
 
Limitations 
There are some important limitations to our study. First, it is based on cross-sectional survey 
data thereby inhibiting us from examining causality. We may be reasonably sure that parent control 
does not influence host country coordination index, and it is unlikely that the association between 
centralization of control and market orientation is explained by control causing market orientation. 
However, direction of causality may be a concern in the case of union density. There is evidence (e.g. 
Hamill, 1984; Singe and Croucher, 2005) that some US MNEs seek to remove or erode the influence 
of labor unions in their subsidiaries as a matter of policy. Hence, it is possible that those MNEs which 
seek to centralize control of HRM policies are also those which use that control to reduce the 
influence of unions.    
We should also be clear that while we are arguing that US MNEs will seek greater control 
over the HRM practices of their subsidiaries based in CMEs than in LMEs, we are not arguing, nor do 
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we test as an outcome that HRM practices in CME subsidiaries will be more similar to those of the 
parent than will be HRM practices in LME subsidiaries. Indeed the opposite is likely to be true, since 
the imposition of greater control is a reaction to the difficulty, in CMEs, of achieving this goal of 
subsidiary congruence with parent HR approaches.  
      We have argued that regardless of location the degree of labor union presence in 
the subsidiary will be a significant determinant of the locus of control of HRM policy. 
Nevertheless, it is feasible that similar levels of union density may confer different levels of 
union influence in LME and CME locations. As we have noted above, in many CME 
locations firm-level union representatives are invariably key members of the works councils. 
These bodies are legally entitled to co-determination, consultation, and access to important 
information, and thereby represent an additional restriction on the degree of managerial 
autonomy that is not found in the LME context (Wächter and Müller-Camen, 2002).  Table 7 
seems to suggest that the effect of unionization may be greater in CMEs than in LMEs, and 
this is plausible since in CMEs labor unions play an import role as guardians of the, legally 
mandated, labor market institutions. However our sample is not adequate to test for such 
interaction effects. Thus, this question of the interaction between the effect of collective 
representation and variety of capitalism must remain a question for future research. 
A further limitation to our findings is that we fail to take into account subsidiary features over 
and above their central strategic function, their size, age and industry. Two features in particular 
should be included in future research, mode of establishment and the creative or contributory mandate 
of the subsidiary. In regard to the first of these, greenfield subsidiaries have been shown to have less 
autonomy than acquisitions because the latter, in having a history, are less amenable to control than 
the former (Rosenzweig and Nohria, 1994; Young et al., 1985). In regard to the second, it is suggested 
(e.g. Taggert and Hood, 1999) that “high contributory” subsidiaries will tend to have greater 
autonomy. Our sectoral control measure also makes a very simplistic distinction between 
manufacturing and service sectors. There are of course also likely to be significant variations within 
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those sectors.  There is, for example, evidence that some service industries are much more global than 
others (e.g,, Lovelock and Yip, 1996). 
Inevitably, this study does not capture some of the detailed nuances of the parent – subsidiary 
relationship, such as the role of regional headquarters and the shifting political dynamics between 
different actors within the MNE.  For this reason our results are most usefully considered alongside 
some of the excellent case study data currently being generated on HR policies within the MNE 
subsidiary relationship (e.g. Almond, et al 2005).   
 
Conclusions 
Research on the issue of subsidiary autonomy has generally been conducted within a research 
perspective that Child (2000:30) refers to as “low context”. That is, there is an emphasis on universal 
market-dominated and technologically driven rationales that are insensitive to specific contexts. In 
this paper we have sought to supplement this perspective with what Child labels a “high context” 
research perspective, by exploring the impact of national contexts in which subsidiaries are socially 
embedded and institutionally rooted.  
Our findings indicate both strategic and institutional context to be important determinants of 
subsidiary autonomy.  The strongest determinant of subsidiary autonomy in regard to HRM is 
strategic, in the sense of whether the subsidiary is serving a purely domestic market or whether it is 
serving international markets. As Harzing (2000) has previously demonstrated, and as our findings 
also indicate, subsidiaries with a domestic market orientation have a significantly greater measure of 
local HRM autonomy than those with international market responsibilities. However, our findings 
also indicate that the institutional location of the subsidiary and the degree to which it confronts labor 
unions are significant determinants of subsidiaries’ HRM autonomy.  
US MNEs clearly resist conceding HRM decision-making to subsidiaries located in CMEs. It 
is after all in CMEs that there will be a particularly pronounced degree of inconsistency between 
institutional norms and the HRM concerns of US MNEs.  It is this inconsistency that these MNEs are 
attempting to redress by centralizing their control of HRM. However, it is also the case that US MNEs 
tend to grant HRM autonomy to their subsidiaries in those cases where the subsidiary has to deal with 
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entrenched labor unions. Unions are a key constituent of local employee relations institutions and 
where they have a strong presence, they are able to resist unilateral imposition of HRM policies to an 
extent which makes the imposition of centralized control impractical. 
 As we have suggested, although high union density is significantly more common in CME 
settings, it would be a mistake to conflate the one with the other. Furthermore, our results support the 
value of considering both strategic and institutional contexts as determinants of the parent subsidiary 
relationship and reinforce the usefulness of the ‘varieties of capitalism’ approach to understanding 
national institutional contexts. However, we accept that national institutional contexts evolve and 
change over time (Streeck and Thelen, 2005). For example as we noted above with the introduction of 
the Industrial Relations Reform Act in 1993 Australia arguably became somewhat more of an LME. 
In the case of Germany it has been claimed by Hassel (1999), that German industrial relations have 
been subject to erosion since the early 1980s; that the institutional base of the German industrial 
system has not been able to transfer its institutions into the growing segment of small and medium-
sized companies in the private service sector. As a consequence it should be recognized that the Hall 
and Gingerich index of 2004 will need to be regularly updated and possibly reworked. 
Finally, it is important to point out that this paper has confined itself to US MNEs. As Harzing 
and Sorge (2003:206) have recently observed, control mechanism are “firmly and primarily 
impregnated by the country of origin” so that MNEs are best conceived “as national firms with 
international operations.”  Similarly, Child et al. (2001) and Geppert et al. (2003) demonstrate the 
influence of the country-of-origin effect on the application of home country practices to subsidiaries. 
In other words, had this paper been concerned with, for example, Japanese rather than US MNEs, the 
approach to centralization would have been different.  
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Table 1. Key HRM practices in relation to requirements for the realization of generic types of control 
aimed at by US MNEs 
 
 
Type of control 
 
 
Requirements Key HRM practices 
Impersonal Highly differentiated pay system 
Flexible employment  contracts. 
Pay policy 
Workforce expansion  
Recruitment & selection 
Industrial relations agenda 
Indirect personal 
 
 
 
Promotion of common values Management development 
Training & development 
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Table 2    Country frequencies and coordination index scores 
Country Frequency coordination index 
 UK 113 .07 
Ireland 81 .29 
Australia 54 .36 
Switzerland 11 .51 
Spain 19 .57 
Netherlands 10 .66 
France 18 .69 
Sweden 11 .69 
Denmark 20 .70 
Finland 3 .72 
Portugal 8 .72 
Belgium 32 .74 
Norway 10 .76 
Italy 5 .87 
Germany 39 .95 
Austria 7 1.00 
Total 441  
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Table 3    Centralized control index: frequencies 
Count Frequency Percent 
0 191 43.3 
1 100 22.7 
2 67 15.2 
3 42 9.5 
4 16 3.6 
5 10 2.3 
6 15 3.4 
Total 441 100.0 
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Table 4    Missing values 
 Count Percent
Centralized control index 0 0.0
Manufacturing sector 0 0.0
Size of subsidiary 22 5.0
Age of subsidiary 78 17.7
Global market 18 4.1
Union density 66 15.0
Coordination 0 0.0
Cases with at least one 
missing value 
153 34.7
N=441 
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Table 5    Multiple imputation zero order correlation estimates 
 Mean (SD) 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1. Centralized control index 1.28 (1.56)       
2. Manufacturing sector 0.58 (0.49) .01      
3. Logn(No. employees) 5.93 (1.11) -.01 .10*     
4. Logn(Organization age) 3.32 (1.03) -.01 .08 .11†    
5. Global market 0.84 (0.38) .14** .11* -.04 -.09†   
6. Union density 3.04 (1.79) -.16** .30*** .07 .14** -.01  
7. Coordination Index 0.44 (0.30) .06 .04 .00 .12* .00 .22*** 
†  p < .10 
* p < .05 
** p < .01 
*** p < .001
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Table 6    Multiple imputation estimates of negative binomial regression parameters. 
Dependent variable: centralized control index. 
 MI 
regression 
coefficient 
estimate 
(B) 
MI Standard 
Error 
Wald 
statistic 
Exp(B) 
Intercept -.06 .40 .03 .94 
Ln (No. employees)) -0.01  0.05  0.02  0.99 
Ln(Age)  0.02  0.07  0.07  1.02 
Manufacturing sector  0.15  0.13  1.32  1.16 
Global market  0.50  0.17  8.42**  1.65 
Union density -0.14  0.04  13.54***  0.87 
Coordination Index  0.40  0.20  3.86* 1.49 
Dispersiona  0.71  0.12  33.03***  
Deviance (deviance/df.)  469.44 (1.08)   
Pearson Chi sq. 
(Chi sq./df.) 
  433.36 (1.00)   
d.f 435    
a. The dispersion index measures the relationship between the mean and variance of the 
independent variable and is used to indicate whether Poisson regression, which relies on 
equality of mean and variance, is appropriate or whether the more general negative binomial 
regression is required. 
* p < .05 
** p < .01 
*** p < .001 
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Table 7    The degree of centralization of HRM in the subsidiaries of US MNEs by   
union membership and country score on the Hall and Gingerich coordination index. 
 
 
Union membership Row 
mean 
(Row 
count) 
 Proportion of subsidiaries with a  non-
zero count on the control index 
(Cell count) 
No 
Union 
Unionise
d 
  
Hall 
coordination 
index 
(Banded) 
low (≤ .29) 61%
(85)
49%
(109)
54% 
(194) 
  medium (.30 - .69) 
 
70%
(20)
53%
(103)
56% 
(123) 
  High( ≤ .70) 
 
89%
(12)
58%
(112)
61% 
(124) 
 Column mean 
(Column count) 
65%
(117)
54%
(324)
57% 
(441) 
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Appendix: treatment of missing values 
This appendix describes the procedure we adopted to account for the significant proportion 
of missing values in the data set. The CRANET survey has a substantial proportion of 
missing values (34.7% listwise across our analyzed variables and sample). 15.0% are 
missing on the union density variable, a key variable for our analysis.  There are also 
significant numbers of missing values for two control variables organization size (17.7%) and 
organization age (5.0%). 
Appropriate strategies for handling missing values in data depend on the nature of the 
'missingness'. If missing values are randomly distributed with no relationship to the value of the 
missing variable or to other variables in the data set (known as missing completely at random or 
MCAR), then both listwise and pairwise deletion of missing values will yield unbiased estimates 
when analyzing the data. Although in the case of pairwise deletion standard errors will be biased 
towards zero and listwise deletion will be inefficient since it discards observations. Multiple 
imputation likewise yields unbiased estimates of parameters, but is more efficient than listwise 
deletion and gives unbiased estimates of standard errors. 
A less stringent assumption concerning missing data is that they are 'missing at random' 
(MAR). That is, if x is a variable with missing (i.e. unobserved) values and xmis is a variable coded 1 
when x is missing and zero otherwise, then after controlling for other observed variables in the 
analysis xmis is independent of the value of x . 
Where data is MAR but not MCAR then both pairwise and listwise deletion will yield biased 
estimates for parameters. In contrast multiple imputation yields unbiased, fully efficient estimates for 
parameters and unbiased estimates of standard errors. 
Where xmis is related to the underlying value of x, after controlling for observed values, this is 
known as non-ignorable (NI) missing data.  Where data is NI missing, pairwise deletion, listwise 
deletion, and multiple imputation all yield biased estimates of parameters. Further, while it is possible 
to distinguish empirically between MCAR and MAR using observed data, it is not possible to 
determine from the observed data whether data is NI missing. However, in many cases it is possible to 
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convert NI missing data to MAR data by controlling for further variables. There may also be a priori 
reasons to believe data to be MAR as opposed to NI. (Allison, 2001; King et al., 2001) 
In the case of our missing union membership data, there is good a priori reason to believe 
missingness will be related significantly to country, since in some European countries legislation 
constrains management from collecting data on union membership.  
Analysis of our data set shows that country does indeed predict missingness accounting for 
27% of the variance. Thus our data is certainly not MCAR. We cannot rule out that the data is NI. 
However, there is no a priori reason to believe respondents will be more or less likely to respond to 
questions about union membership as a consequence of high or low levels of union membership. 
Further we are in a position to draw on a wide range of relevant variables in the Euronet-Cranfield 
data set in order to impute missing values for union membership. 
In addition to the variables in our reported analyses, we included the following variables in 
the imputation procedure for missing values: Home country, sector, whether national level pay 
bargaining, presence of works council, percentage of workforce under 25, percentage of workforce 
over 45, percentage of manual workers in workforce, and whether a union is used as a channel of 
communication with the workforce. Using all variables to predict missingness on the union 
membership variable with the general linear model accounts for 50% of variance (Adj Rsq = .50). The 
largest proportion of variance is accounted for by country (partial Eta Sq = .27). Thus having 
controlled for a significant proportion of variance in missingness and there being no a priori reason to 
suspect missingness to be related to level of union membership we may have some confidence that the 
data is MAR not NI missing. 
Thus the most appropriate approach to dealing with the missing data is to use multiple 
imputation. We used the approach described by King and associates (2001). The missing values are 
imputed multiple times (usually 3 to 5 is sufficient) to generate multiple data sets. Analysis is then 
carried out on each imputed data set separately. The missing value imputation was carried out using 
the King et al. (2001) software Amelia, with 5 imputed data sets. Model parameters are calculated as 
the average of the parameters from each separate analysis. This process gives unbiased estimators for 
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model parameters and allows an adjustment to standard errors to allow for the uncertainty of imputed 
values. Standard errors are calculated by: 
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